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Using OLS regression with World Values Survey data across 18 OECD countries, I make 
two major arguments. Firstly, if a dominant party is ideologically congruent with an 
individual, its dominance enhances the effect of its left/right placement on the self-
placement of the individual. If incongruent, greater dominance only inhibits this effect. 
Secondly, if people find the dominant party ideologically congruent, as their political 
awareness increases, the effect of that party’s left/righ  placement rises monotonically. If 
incongruent, the effect of party ideology first rises and then falls back. Therefore, party 
dominance leads ultimately to increasing ideological polarization between the dominant 
party’s supporters and opponents. This implies that the proporti nal vision of political 
representation is more effective than the majoritarian vision. It also implies that, 
embedded in democratic theory, the ideal of a mature democracy shared by a highly 
























This paper examines how dominant parties influence the process whereby parties’ 
left/right stance affects individuals’ left/right self-placement in industrialized 
democracies. Using World Values Survey data across 18 OECD countries, I argue that 
party dominance acts as a moderator in the ideological transmission process, enhancing a 
party’s ability to transmit its left/right ideological stance to its own supporters, but 
inhibiting its ability to do so to other people, leading ultimately to increasing ideological 
polarization between the dominant party’s supporters and opponents. Therefore, 
Pempel’s argument that dominant parties have the ability to shape the ideological and 
policy agenda of an entire country (1990b) proves not wholly accurate: dominant parties 
cannot shape agenda beyond their own supporters. Actually, as a p rty becomes more 
dominant in a country, it can ideologically further antagonize people who are not its 
supporters, rather than swaying their political opinion around to its side. Based on this 
polarizing effect of dominant parties, I further argue that the proportional vision of 
political representation, which takes into consideration the opinion not only of the 
supporters but also the opposition, is more effective than t e majoritarian vision, which 
substitutes the opinion of supporters for the whole society (Powell, 2000). The first 
section of the paper defines and measures party dominance. The second section utilizes 
Zaller’s theories (1992) and offers two hypotheses about h w dominant parties affect the 
ideological beliefs of the public. The third section explains data and measurement. The 
fourth section discusses the findings and shows that both hypotheses are supported by the 
data analysis. The last section concludes, speculates on this study’s implications for 
theories of political representation and offers proposals for future studies. 
 
1. Defining and Measuring Party Dominance 
So what is party dominance and how to measure it? We can get a flavour of what 
political scientists traditionally expect of party dominance by briefly looking at some of 
the arguments in the literature. Duverger’s interpretation is probably the most frequently 
quoted, both for broaching the subject and for its eloquence: “a party is dominant when it 
is identified with an epoch, when its doctrines, ideas, methods, its style, so to speak, 
coincide with those of the epoch” (1959: 275-80). Sartori, on the other hand, offers the 
pithy definition whereby a party “is dominant in that it is s gnificantly stronger than the 
others” (1976: 193). Definitions of this kind are helpful in giving a rough idea of what a 
dominant party looks like but not very easy to measure. Nevertheless, based on 
definitions such as those by Duverger and Sartori, plus exemplar cases of dominant 
parties in the empirical world, such as Democrazia Cristiana (DC) in Italy and 
Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet (SAP) in Sweden, a general idea of dominant parties 
can start to take some shape. A clear message is that a party is dominant only if it is very 
strong and preferably stronger than any other party in the party system. Then, what 
dimensions of party strength should be included in my definition of party dominance?  
 
In the not extensive literature on party dominance in liberal democracies, Pempel’s edited 
volume (1990a) is a rare example of offering clearly measurable indicators of a party’s 
strength in determining its degree of dominance. Pempel’s multidimensional definition of 
party dominance takes into consideration a wide range of party strength indicators: seats, 
 3 
votes, bargaining position, government duration and policy influe ce (1990a: 2-5). 
Another set of measurable indicators of party dominance is offered by Boucek (1998).  
Boucek dimensionalizes party dominance into electoral, parliamentary and executive 
dominance. Different from Pempel, who focuses on the empirical representation of party 
dominance, Boucek delves deeper into the causes behind such dominance to emphasize 
its institutional and strategic prerequisites. For example, Boucek approaches electoral 
dominance through the mechanical effects of electoral systems, the partisan manipulation 
of electoral laws and the strategic reaction of opposition parties. In the same vein, the 
indicators Boucek recommends for measuring party dominance partly stem from the 
electoral systems literature: the effective number of electoral and legislative parties, the 
relation between these two numbers, and an “advantage ratio” given to the dominant 
parties as a bonus from the electoral system.  
 
I rely on the Pempel rather than the Boucek indicators  measure party dominance for 
the purpose of this paper. First of all, the Boucek indicators distinctively lack a dynamic 
element. Party dominance means much more than the vote and seat advantages conferred 
by electoral laws to one party at one point in time. It is largely meaningless to talk about 
party dominance without a longitudinal perspective. The longitudinal dimension of 
dominance is captured in Pempel’s indicators (government duraion). Furthermore, my 
paper is more concerned with the effect rather than the cause of party dominance. 
Boucek’s heavy emphasis on the cause of party dominance, su h as electoral systems, is 
therefore not very suitable for this paper’s substantive objectives. However, I also make 
some changes to Pempel’s indicators of party dominance before applying them to 
empirical cases. I eliminate the dimension of “policy influence” from Pempel’s 
indicators. Policy influence is arguably more of an indirect rather than direct 
representation of a party’s strength, such as seats, votes or years spent in government. It 
is itself a huge leap of faith to automatically assume strong partisan influence on public 
policy when it comes to dominant parties. Actually it is heoretically more interesting to 
regard a party’s policy influence as a dependent rather than independent variable in 
examining the effect of party dominance. Just as this paper examines how a party’s 
degree of dominance affects its influence on public opinion, it is equally interesting 
theoretically to question if party dominance really relates to partisan influence on public 
policy. Before this question is satisfactorily answered, partisan influence on public policy 
should not be regarded as a direct indicator of party dominance. In my paper, party 
dominance will be measured by the following indicators: votes, seats, years spent in 
government and coalitional bargaining strength.   
 
2. The Effect of Party Dominance on Ideological Transmission 
There are many theoretical possibilities about the effect of party dominance on the 
characteristics of parties and the general public. Dominant p rties can be the integrators 
of national interest (Pempel, 1990a: 16), masters of cliente sm (Shalev, 1990: 115), 
manipulators of national identity (Chu, 1999: 86), guarantors of the fundamental safety of 
the nation’s democracy (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999: 3), consensus-builders (Pontusson, 
1990: 61) or polarizers (Krauss and Pierre, 1990: 228-229), flexible adapters or rigid 
conservatives (Krauss and Pierre, 1990: 253). Party dominance c turn the public into 
holders of authoritarian attitudes (Schlemmer, 1999: 287), advoc tes of interventionist 
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states (Jesudason, 1999: 155), promoters of the welfare state and rapid economic growth 
(Krauss and Pierre, 1990: 232), but yet holders of low expectation for government 
performance or even economic conservatives (Inoguchi, 1990: 196-199). Obviously 
many of these theories are self-contradictory, and most of them remain untested. In this 
paper I only focus on one aspect, which leads back to the riginal Duverger argument: the 
role of dominant parties in shaping public agenda. Long-term do inance by a political 
party can make a country different from others. It provides the party in question “with a 
continuous opportunity to pursue its historical agenda…shape its own following” 
(Panebianco, 1988: 4, cited in Pempel, 1990a: 6-7).  The party can reshape the entire 
political profile of the country: symbols, values and public expectation (Pempel, 1990b: 
336), and the dominant party’s view becomes the consensus of the whole society 
(Giliomee and Simkins, 1999: 37). It is therefore clear that scholars from Duverger 
onwards all emphasize that greater party dominance enhances the party’s ability to 
influence or sway public opinion. This leads to the central research question for this 
paper: how effective is party dominance in enhancing a party’s ability to transmit its 
political ideology to ordinary people?  
 
Values and ideologies come in many forms. In order to keep th  paper reasonably 
comparative across a large number of liberal democracies, I need to find some political 
value or ideology that occupies more than an insignificant p rt of ordinary people’s own 
battery of political predispositions in most countries. Left/right self-placement is one 
excellent candidate. The precise meaning of left and right is inevitably different for 
different countries, and the materialism/postmaterialism distinction increasingly crosscuts 
the traditional left/right division. Nevertheless, the left/right self-placement is still one of 
the most frequently measured ideological indicators of public opinion. From the 
perspective of party manifestos, Budge et al. (1987) also demonstrate that the left/right 
spectrum still works as the most significant ideological leavage in differentiating 
political parties in advanced liberal democracies. What this paper sets out to do, 
therefore, is to see how party dominance helps (or impedes) in transmitting the left/right 
placement of parties to the left/right self-placement of individuals. 
 
Two questions remain. First of all, does people’s left/right self-placement influence that 
of parties or the other way around? Secondly, isn’t ideological left/right placement 
largely exogenous, determined by long term sociological factors (Knutsen, 1995) and 
usually presumed as being a constant? For the first question, it is important to keep in 
mind that, compared to individual citizens, political parties are aggregate level variables. 
Political parties as aggregates take ideological cues not from any specific individual but 
from the general public as a whole. In other words, if all individuals’ ideology is 
aggregated before being analyzed, there will indeed be a non-recursive relationship 
between party ideology and individual ideology. However, as long as I keep the unit of 
analysis at the individual level, which is also the appro riate strategy for World Values 
Survey data, the causal path from individual ideology to party ideology should be treated 
as non-existent.  With regard to the second question, even if sociological factors might 
“lock in” people’s ideological self-placement, it is conceivable that individuals do update 
their political beliefs by internalizing political messages sent from parties. Zaller provides 
an excellent framework as to how such internalization of political messages takes place 
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through a resistance axiom: “people tend to resist arguments that are inconsistent with 
their political predispositions…to the extent that they possess the contextual information” 
(1992). This resistance axiom is also the foundation for this paper’s theories about the 
effect of party dominance on left/right ideological transmission. 
 
Within the framework of the axiom, Zaller offers three scenarios where, as long as there 
is sufficient contextual information, individuals actually utilize such information to reject 
political messages from parties incongruent with their own political predispositions 
(1992: 121). These three scenarios are: partisan resistance: individuals refuse to 
internalize a  political message if they are provided with information cues helping them to 
recognize that this message comes from an incongruent political party; inertial 
resistance: individuals who already possess a large amount of existing chemas use such 
schemas to wash out any incongruent message they happen to already internalize, and 
countervalent resistance: individuals internalize schemas directly opposing those coming 
from the incongruent parties, again neutralizing the influence of any incongruent message 
they accidentally internalize. Therefore, the transmis ion of party left/right placement to 
individual self-placement depends on the directionality of the party in question: whether 
the party in question is ideologically congruent with the individual or not. Borrowing a 
term from the directional theory of issue voting, this means distinguishing, in the mind of 
each individual, between messages from parties who are “on our side” and those who are 
not (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989).  
 
If people find the dominant party ideologically congruent wih their own political 
predispositions, the relationship between party dominance d ideological transmission 
should be straightforward. The more dominant the party becomes the more likely people 
will accept its messages. On the other hand, if the party is ideologically incongruent, a 
different process takes place. Now, the more dominant the party becomes, the greater its 
penetration of mass communication and political discourse channels, and the more 
contextual information it creates. According to Zaller’s resistance axiom, the availability 
of such contextual information is the crucial factor in activating the three forms of 
individual resistance against a dominant but ideologically incongruent party: partisan 
resistance, inertial resistance  and countervalent resistance. Th  more dominant presence 
of the party helps an individual to realize the incongruent nature of the party’s political 
messages and resist the internalization of such messages (parti an resistance). After 
recognizing the incongruent nature of the dominant party, the individual has increasing 
incentives to activate existing schemas (inertial resistance) or actively internalize 
schemas countervalent against the messages of the dominant political party 
(countervalent resistance), so that any incongruent political message accidentally 
internalized is neutralized. Therefore, based on Zaller’s three dimensions of resistance 
axiom, the first hypothesis of the paper is as follows: 
 
H1:  If the dominant party is ideologically congruent with an individual, its dominance 
will enhance the effect of its left/right placement on the self-placement of the individual. 
If the party is ideologically incongruent, greater dominance only inhibits thi effect. 
Interacting with party ideology, party dominance is a moderator in the process of party 
ideology influencing individual ideology. 
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However, party dominance is not the only moderator in thisprocess. Another such 
moderator is the political awareness of the individual. Z ler uses the distinction between 
mainstream and polarization effects (1992: 98-102) to analyze the role played by political 
awareness. In a mainstream effect scenario for people, the dominant party sending the 
political messages is “on their side.” Zaller argues that since people find these messages 
from an ideologically congruent party convincing, the persuasive effect of these messages 
will increase monotonically with people’s political awareness. In a polarization effect 
scenario, the situation is more complex. Now we have people for whom the dominant 
party is no longer “on their side.” For people with a mini um level of political 
awareness, they have little access to political message from the incongruent dominant 
party any way. For those with a maximum level of awareness, they have a lot of 
contextual information to utilize any one of the three forms of resistance axiom 
mentioned earlier. Therefore, a curvilinear relationship between political persuasion and 
awareness emerges. Moderately aware individuals will be more susceptible towards 
political messages from the ideologically incongruent dominant party than people on both 
ends of the awareness scale. Polarization effect, therefore, means that a moderate level of 
political awareness among the public is more effective in nhancing the dominant party’s 
political discourse than both high and low levels of political awareness. Based on Zaller’s 
mainstream and polarization effects, he second hypothesis of the paper is as follows: 
 
H2:  If people find the dominant party ideologically congruent, as their political 
awareness increases, the effect of that party’s left/right placement on their own self-
placement will rise monotonically. If the party is ideologically incongruent, with 
increasing political awareness the effect of party ideology should first rise and then fall 
back. Interacting with party ideology, people’s political awareness is a moderator in the 
process of party ideology influencing individual ideology. 
 
I test these two hypotheses in a multiple regression setup where the dependent variable is 
an individual’s left/right self-placement. The crucial predictor is the left/right placement 
of the dominant party. Two important moderators are the degree of party dominance and 
the political awareness of the individual. Other necessary predictors, such as socio-
economic status, are also included. For individuals who do not find the most dominant 
party ideologically congruent, they probably will find some other parties ideologically 
congruent. For these individuals, I use the party they intend o vote for as a proxy for the 
one party they find ideologically most congruent. I also include as an additional predictor 
the left/right placement of this ideologically most congruent party, and include this 
party’s degree of dominance as an additional moderator. This is because for individuals 
who do not agree ideologically with the dominant party, their political attitudes should be 
influenced not only by the most dominant party but also by their own party (the party 
with which they feel the closest political affinity). Next I explain how each variable in the 
regression analysis is measured and the relevant data. 
 
3. Data and Measurement  
The Dependent Variable 
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In order to measure the left/right self-placement of individuals across different countries, 
I use the 1993 wave of the World Values Survey, which covers 18 highly industrialized 
democracies.1 I use variable V248 of the survey, which asked a question abut left/right 
self-placement on a 10-point scale. 
 
The Moderators 
In order to measure the degree of party dominance for each party, I rely on Pempel’s 
indicators of party dominance (1990a). Since party dominance is a longitudinal concept, 
an appropriate timeframe within which to calculate party dominance is necessary. As 
noted earlier, the dependent variable is measured with data from the 1993 wave of World 
Values Survey, which completed data collection in the early spring of 1993. I preserve 
temporal correspondence by measuring party dominance between 1973 and 1992 
inclusive. I choose a 20-year period because if the timefra is set too short, not enough 
time accumulates to generate sufficient amount of political dominance for any party. On 
the other hand, if the timeframe is set too long, further into the past I will come across 
increasing problems of disappearance of parties or changes of party systems. 
Furthermore, as party dominance is traced further to the distant past, its influence on 
people’s answers to that specific World Values Survey in the early 1990s probably also 
recedes further. In the 18 liberal democracies I arbitrarily only examine parties which had 
garnered on average at least 10 per cent of the votes in general lections in the 20-year 
period. It makes little sense to talk about party dominance for parties which cannot even 
win a nontrivial number of votes in elections. 
 
Within this timeframe of two decades, I examine Pempel’s indicators of party 
dominance: votes, seats, duration of government and coalition bargaining strength. The 
vote indicator of party dominance is tapped by the av rage vote percentage obtained by a 
party after each parliamentary election. Theoretically of course this indicator is bounded 
between zero and one. The seat indicator is similarly tapped by the average seat 
percentage obtained by a party after each parliamentary election. Theoretically this 
indicator is also bounded between zero and one.2 The chronological indicator is tapped by 
the ratio between the average number of continuously governing years for a party and the 
whole period (20 years).3 The average number of continuously governing years is 
obtained through dividing the total number of continuously governing years for the party 
by the number of continuously governing periods. Theoretically the maximum situation is 
where the average number of continuously governing years is 20, and the ratio is one. 
The minimum situation is of course zero. So this indicator is also bounded between zero 
and one. Finally, the bargaining strength indicator is tapped by the ratio between the total 
number of years in coalition government for a party and the whole period (20 years). 
Time spent in coalition government is an indicator of bargaining strength because if a 
party stays in coalition consistently, it very likely implies that the party holds an 
advantageous coalitional bargaining position, since coalitins cannot be made without the 
party. Again, this indicator is bounded between zero and one. For countries without 
coalition experience, of course the indicator has a value of zero.4 Computation of 
Cronbach’s α  (α =0.654) indicates that the four indicators cannot be combined into one 
single composite index. Rather, the more suitable approach is to combine votes and seats 
(α =0.978, and correlation=0.971) into one index of party dominance, and then combine 
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the government duration and bargaining strength indicators (α =0.781, and 
correlation=0.641) into another. When a party’s value on the dominance index is the sum 
of the vote and seat indicators, I call it party dominance on the electoral dimension. When 
the index is the sum of government duration and bargaining strength indicators, I call it 
party dominance on the governmental dimension. Since the party dominance index on 
each dimension is a sum of two indicators bounded between z ro and one, the value of 
these indexes is bounded between zero and two. The multiple regression analysis is 
therefore run separately for the two different dimensio  of party dominance. For all the 
parties examined, their values on each of the four separat  indicators of party dominance, 
plus the composite dominance index on both dimensions, are rep sented in Table 5 in 
Appendix A. 
 
The other important moderator is the political awareness of the individual, tapped in 
World Values Survey by variable V241, a four-point scale measur  of political interest. I 
recode this variable so that V241=1 indicates no interest at all, the lowest level of 
political awareness. Political awareness, therefore, is a dummy variable in the multiple 
regression analysis, with the reference category being the lowest level of awareness. 
 
The Predictors 
The most important predictor is the left/right placement of the dominant party. In each 
party system the dominant party can be identified as the one with the highest party 
dominance index value, either on the electoral or the governm ntal dimension. I use 
Hubert and Inglehart’s expert survey on party left/right placement (1995). This survey 
was done relatively close to the 1993 wave of the World Values Survey, so it reasonably 
fits my period of examination. Other similar expert surveys either do not use a 10-point 
scale (Laver and Budge, 1992; Laver and Hunt, 1992) or are too early to match the World 
Values Survey data (Castles and Mair, 1984). Another important predictor, specifically 
for individuals who do not find the dominant party ideologically congruent, is the 
left/right placement of the party with which these individuals feel the closest political 
affinity. This brings up the question of how to judge whether an individual finds a party 
ideologically congruent or not. Unfortunately, no questions were asked in the 1993 World 
Values Survey about partisan preference or affinity. The closest proxy is vote preference 
(for a general election tomorrow). In other words, if people intend to vote for a party, 
they very likely do find that party ideologically congruent. Finally, variable V363, a 10-
point scale measure of income level is included as a socio-economic predictor of an 
individual’s left/right placement.  
 
The World Values Survey data for the 18 countries are divided into two parts, one where 
the respondents find the dominant party ideologically congruet and the other where the 
respondents find another non-dominant party ideologically congruent. Multiple 
regressions have to be run separately for these two groups of re pondents, because the 
predictors included are different. For those people who do not find the dominant party 
ideologically congruent, an extra predictor and moderator are included: the left/right 
placement and the degree of dominance for the party, which, though not the most 
dominant in the country, is ideologically congruent with te respondents. Two 
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dimensions of party dominance, interacting with two types of respondents, result in four 
regression analyses and outputs in total. 
 
4. Findings and Discussion 
First of all, as Appendix B explains in greater detail, Extreme Bound Analysis 
demonstrates that the estimators for all four regression are very robust, given the very 
large number of combinations of Z variables used in performing Extreme Bound 
Analysis. This also boosts our confidence in the paper’s findings to a great extent.  
 
The first hypothesis of the paper suggests that party dominance should have effect in 
opposite directions depending on whether the respondents find the dominant party 
ideologically congruent. This stems from Zaller’s three applications of the resistance 
axiom: partisan, inertial and countervalent resistance. The regression results nicely 
support both the hypothesis and Zaller’s principles. We first consider party dominance 
measured on the dimension of seats and votes. As the output in Table 1 indicates, for 
respondents who do not find the dominant party ideologically congruent, the impact of 
party ideology on individual self-placement is about three times greater for the non-
dominant but ideologically congruent party than for the incongruent dominant party. 
When party dominance is measured on the governmental dimension, Table 2 shows a 
similar result, only more clearly. The coefficient for the congruent party is now more than 
10 times greater than the coefficient for the incongruent but dominant party. Even more 
fascinating results lie in the interaction terms. On the governmental dimension of party 
dominance, the dominance-ideology interaction term unfortunately drops out of statistical 
significance for the incongruent party, as shown in Table 2. However, on the electoral 
dimension of party dominance, Table 1 shows that the dominance-ideology interaction 
term indeed generates a positive coefficient for the congruent non-dominant party but a 
negative coefficient, twice as great, for the most dominant bu incongruent party. 
Therefore, political dominance of the congruent party enhances its ideological impact on 
individual left/right self-placement, but for the incongruent party, its dominance serves to 
restrain its ideological impact. This is exactly what is predicted in the first hypothesis. 
The first hypothesis also suggests that if respondents find the most dominant party 
ideologically congruent, this party’s degree of dominance enhances its ability to transmit 
its ideological placement to the respondents. This again is confirmed in Tables 3 and 4, 
on both dimensions of party dominance, as seen in the positive coefficients for the 
dominance-ideology interaction terms. Therefore, the first hypothesis of the paper, 
together with Zaller’s resistance axiom, is well supported by evidence from the data. 
 
Insert Tables 1 through 4 about here 
 
The second hypothesis of the paper emphasizes the difference between monotonic or 
curvilinear changing patterns for the impact of the dominant par y’s ideology as the 
political awareness of the public increases. If respondents fi d the dominant party 
ideologically congruent, as their political awareness increases, the effect of party 
ideology rises monotonically, according to Zaller’s mainstream effect scenario. If the 
dominant party is ideologically incongruent, a curvilinear pattern of first rising and then 
falling effect of party ideology should be expected, according to Zaller’s polarization 
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effect scenario. At different levels of the dummy variable for p litical awareness, the 
coefficients for party ideology can be obtained. This is done by adding the coefficients 
for the awareness-ideology interaction term at various levels of political awareness to the 
coefficients for party ideology when political awareness belongs to the reference 
category. Following this procedure, from Table 1 we can see that, on the electoral 
dimension of party dominance, the coefficients for party ideology are in turn 0.684, 
0.619, 0.654 and 0.748 for the congruent non-dominant party as we mov from the 
politically least aware to most aware respondents.5 This offers weak support for Zaller’s 
mainstream effect: for the congruent party greater political awareness indeed boosts the 
impact of party ideology, but the rise of such impact is not really monotonic. A similar 
conclusion can be drawn by examining the governmental dimension of party dominance, 
as Table 2 implies that as political awareness increases the coefficients for party ideology 
are in turn 0.696, 0.645, 0.683 and 0.795 for the congruent party. Support for Zaller’s 
mainstream effect is clearer if one examines Tables 3 and 4. Here respondents already 
find the dominant party ideologically congruent. From Table 3 we can see that as 
political awareness of the respondents increases, the coefficients for the dominant party’s 
ideology are respectively 0.547, 0.551, 0.562 and 0.58. When party dominance is 
measured on the governmental dimension as in Table 4, the coefficients are in turn 0.494, 
0.497, 0.511 and 0.547. Therefore, if the dominant party is ideologically congruent, there 
is indeed a monotonic increase in the impact of the party’s ideology as the political 
awareness of respondents increases.  
 
For the dominant but incongruent party, on the other hand, the respective coefficients for 
party ideology are 0.217, 0.270, 0.251 and 0.166 in Table 1 with increasing levels of 
political awareness. This offers strikingly clear support f r the paper’s second hypothesis 
and Zaller’s polarization effect. For the dominant but ideologically incongruent party, 
rising political awareness first boosts the impact of party ideology but then depresses it. 
As Table 2 shows, such curvilinear pattern is also clearly observed on the governmental 
dimension of party dominance, where the coefficients for the dominant party’s left/right 
placement are respectively 0.046, 0.076, 0.053 and –0.062 as the political awareness of 
respondents increases. The second hypothesis of the paper, tog ther with Zaller’s 
mainstream and polarization effects, i  strongly supported by evidence from the data. 
Therefore, both hypotheses of the paper are supported, on both dimensions of party 
dominance.  
 
To sum up the discussion, whether it is the electoral or governmental dimension of 
political dominance, data from the 18 advanced liberal democracies ultimately support 
the following core theories: 
 
(1) If people already find the dominant party in the party system ideologically congruent 
with their own political predispositions, the party’s dominance enhances its ability to 
transmit its left/right placement to people’s left/right self-placement. For these people, the 
more politically aware they become, the more effectiv  he dominant party becomes in 
transmitting its party ideology, so the effectiveness of party political persuasion increases 
monotonically with increasing levels of political awareness. 
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(2) If people find the dominant party ideologically incongruent, the party’s dominance 
inhibits its ability to transmit its left/right placement to people’s left/right self-placement. 
For these people, as their political awareness increases, the effect of the dominant party’s 
ideology on their left/right self-placement first increases than decreases, resulting in a 
curvilinear pattern.  
 
5. Conclusion and Speculation 
So in light of the paper’s examination of 18 countries, is dominance really “a question of 
influence” (Duverger, 1959: 308)? Does the dominant party shape the entire political 
profile of the country, including its values, symbols and expectations (Pempel, 1990b: 
336)? What is the implication of my findings for theories of political representation? My 
answer to Duverger’s claim is that dominance is indeed a question of influence, but it is a 
positive influence for the dominant party only for part of he general public, those people 
who already find the dominant party congruent with their own political predispositions.  
For the rest of the public, the influence of party dominance is actually negative, as greater 
dominance makes it even harder for the dominant party to sway political attitudes. This in 
turn leads to the rejection of Pempel’s claim: a dominant party indeed shapes political 
profiles, values, symbols and expectations, but only for people already sharing its 
political beliefs. For other individuals, the dominant party will only push them further 
and further away the greater its political dominance. Contrary to Giliomee and Simkins 
(1999), the dominant party’s view will never become the consensus of the society. This 
paper’s theories probably to some extent explain why, in a country with long-term 
dominance of a single party, we sometimes find large opposition parties that are 
relatively extreme in ideology. The right-wing Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, for 
example, faced a large and un-reformist socialist party, nd the centrist DC in Italy found 
itself in the centre of “polarized pluralism” (Sartori 1976). Another interesting theoretical 
implication stems from my paper’s finding that, if the public find a party ideologically 
incongruent, the effectiveness of the party in swaying public opinion has a curvilinear 
relationship with the public’s political awareness. This implies that, despite politicians’ 
constant lamentation of the political apathy of the general public, a politically very acute 
and sensitive public is just as difficult to deal with as a public with absolutely no interest 
in all things political. In other words, unless every one in a society agrees with the 
governing party or parties, which is not possible in a free democracy, a very high level of 
political awareness has the potential to polarize the country into diehard supporters and 
opponents of the government. Embedded in democratic theory, the ideal of a mature 
democracy shared by a highly involved and participatory public seems to be flawed in 
design after all.  
 
In addition to implications for democratic theory, my paper’s arguments also offer a 
perspective on the search for an appropriate system of political representation. The 
conclusion that the dominant party’s view will never become the consensus of the society 
obviously casts doubt on the effectiveness of governing parties alone as instruments of 
political representation. Powell distinguishes between the majoritarian and proportional 
visions of representative democracy, and demonstrates that left/right ideological 
congruence between individuals and parties is better achieved n the latter than in the 
former systems (2000). My conclusion indirectly corroborates Powell’s theory: given that 
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parties have the potential to polarize public opinion into those who regard them as “on 
our side” and those not, electoral systems that focus only on the winning side of the 
public (majoritarian) inevitably overlook the preferences of th se on the losing side. On 
the other hand, the proportional representational systems, through bargaining, power-
sharing in government and, most crucially, the constructive role opposition parties play in 
the policy-making process, manage to take care of both supporters and opponents and 
achieve a closer congruence between parties and general public opinion. My conclusion 
corroborates Powell’s arguments only indirectly because I approach the issue from the 
perspective of public opinion, whereas Powell does so by examining the congruence 
between party policy and voter policy preference. This ra es a possibility for future 
research. If the dominant party cannot shape the agenda for public opinion, what about 
the agenda for public policy?  
 
The more dominant a political party is, the more access it i  bound to have to the policy 
deliberation process. A crucial difference between the cases of public policy and public 
opinion is that for the former, the influence of party dominance is comparatively less 
dependent on the process of political discourse and persuasion. Government policy 
cannot disregard public opinion, but clearly there is much more to public opinion when a 
party in government is in the process of policy deliberation. Actually it is not unusual to 
find political parties pursing unpopular policies once in government. In the realm of 
public policy, it is possible that party dominance has more leeway to exercise its 
influence. Therefore, Duverger’s vision about the influence of the dominant party is 
probably more realistic on public policy than on public opinion. As noted in the first 
section of the paper, it is theoretically more interesting to regard a party’s policy 
influence as a dependent rather than independent variable in examining the effect of party 
dominance. 
 
Klingemann et al. distinguish between three possible mechanisms through which political 
parties exercise their policy influence: the agenda, mandate and ideological models 
(1994). The authors find that both the mandate (holding office) and ideological 
(congruence between a party’s and government policy’s ideological stance) models 
predict poorly the partisan influence on public policy.  Form st countries in their study it 
is the agenda model that delivers best results. The agenda mo el tries to measure the 
correspondence between party programmes and overall government policy, regardless of 
whether the party is in government or not. If there is indeed a close correspondence 
between a party’s programme and the public policy agenda of the country, this would be 
a perfect description of parties shaping public policy agenda. Can this congruence 
between party programme and national policy agenda be influenced by the dominance of 
the party in question? The Klingemann et al. agenda model can be interpreted as follows: 
 




1  (1994: 65)                                                     (1). 
      where iE = the percentage of expenditures emphasized in national policy for country I; 
               niP = the percentage of expenditures emphasized in the party programme of 
party n for country i.  
 
 13 
Both iE and 
n
iP  were calculated by Klingemann et al. using content analysis as part of 
the Comparative Manifestos Project. What this model implies of course is that for each 
party in country i, there is a different coefficient for its party platform. Why should party 
programmes for each party have a different impact on the final policy emphasis of the 
national government? One possible reason is that different parties have different degrees 
of dominance. I can tentatively re-specify the agenda model as : 
 
       eCbPDbaE ki
n
ki ++×+= ∑ 21                                                                           (2). 
       where kD = the dominance index value (either on the electoral or governmental  
dimension) for the k-th party in country I; 
                    C = a categorical predictor which distinguishes between different policy 
areas; 
       all other variables being defined as before. 
 
The interaction between each party’s programme and their dominance index value, 
summed for all parties, serves as a new predictor in equation (2). Of course the impact of 
party programme in shaping public policy agenda can also be affected by the nature of 
the policy itself. Some policy areas are simply less amenable to big overhauls than others, 
and this is why the categorical predictor C is included to distinguish between different 
policy areas.  
 
This paper already offers data for calculatingkD . Measurement for iE  and 
k
iP  can be 
calculated with data from the Party Manifestos Project. This new agenda model of 
partisan policy influence has the potential for a continuing project in explaining the role 


























Indicators of Party Dominance and Indexes of Party Dominance 
 Votes Seats 
Party 
Dominance 













OVP 0.403 0.41 0.813 0.3 0.3 0.6 
SPO 0.47 0.479 0.949 1 0.5 1.5 
Belgium  
CVP 0.303 0.334 0.637 1 1 2 
BSP 0.269 0.298 0.567 0.225 0.45 0.675 
PVV 0.185 0.197 0.382 0.225 0.45 0.675 
Canada  
CON 0.394 0.506 0.9 0.4 0 0.4 
LIB 0.375 0.376 0.751 0.25 0 0.25 
NDP 0.185 0.108 0.293 0 0 0 
Denmark  
S 0.324 0.333 0.657 0.3 0.05 0.35 
KF 0.144 0.149 0.293 0.55 0.55 1.1 
V 0.135 0.139 0.274 0.5 0.55 1.05 
France  
Gaullist 0.253 0.285 0.538 0.4 0.4 0.8 
PS 0.298 0.351 0.649 0.25 0.15 0.4 
UDF/CDS 0.185 0.156 0.341 0.1 0.25 0.35 
PCF 0.159 0.105 0.264 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Finland  
SDP 0.243 0.267 0.51 0.45 0.9 1.35 
KESK 0.193 0.208 0.401 0.4 0.8 1.2 
KOK 0.216 0.219 0.435 0.3 0.3 0.6 
VAS 0.14 0.141 0.281 0.3 0.35 0.65 
Germany  
CDU/CSU 0.46 0.474 0.934 0.55 0.55 1.1 
SPD 0.388 0.398 0.786 0.45 0.45 0.9 
Ireland  
FF 0.452 0.477 0.929 0.25 0.2 0.45 
FG 0.324 0.346 0.67 0 0.5 0.5 
LP 0.111 0.111 0.222 0 0.5 0.5 
Italy  
PCI 0.275 0.289 0.564 0 0 0 
DC 0.348 0.378 0.726 1 0.85 1.85 
PSI 0.117 0.12 0.237 0.217 0.65 0.867 
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 Votes Seats 
Party 
Dominance 















CDA 0.324 0.333 0.657 0.6 0.6 1.2 
PvdA 0.315 0.327 0.642 0 0.45 0.45 
VVD 0.181 0.185 0.366 0.45 0.45 0.9 
Japan  
LDP 0.459 0.523 0.982 1 0.125 1.125 
Communist 0.095 0.005 0.1 0 0 0 
Socialist 0.201 0.218 0.419 0 0 0 
Norway  
DNA 0.38 0.433 0.813 0.25 0 0.25 
H 0.253 0.268 0.521 0.25 0.2 0.45 
KrF 0.102 0.112 0.214 0.15 0.2 0.35 
Portugal  
PS 0.295 0.331 0.626 0.1 0.15 0.25 
PSD 0.267 0.312 0.579 0.65 0.25 0.9 
PCP 0.152 0.136 0.288 0 0 0 
Spain  
PSOE 0.384 0.457 0.841 0.5 0 0.5 
PP 0.184 0.196 0.38 0 0 0 
IU 0.076 0.041 0.117 0 0 0 
UCD 0.153 0.18 0.333 0.2 0 0.2 
Sweden  
SAP 0.43 0.442 0.872 0.375 0 0.375 
M 0.193 0.199 0.392 0 0.3 0.3 
C 0.161 0.169 0.33 0 0.35 0.35 
FP 0.104 0.106 0.21 0.3 0.35 0.65 
Switzerland  
SP 0.221 0.238 0.459 1 1 2 
FDP 0.227 0.247 0.474 1 1 2 
CVP 0.201 0.21 0.411 1 1 2 




CON 0.407 0.524 0.931 0.7 0 0.7 
LAB 0.344 0.415 0.759 0.25 0 0.25 
LIB 0.195 0.027 0.222 0 0 0 
United States  
DEM 0.54 0.613 1.153 1 0 1 




Appendix B  
 
Table 6 
Extreme Bound Analysis for Multiple Regression of Left/Right Self-Placement for 
Respondents Ideologically Incongruent with the Dominant Party, When Party 
Dominance is Measured on the Electoral Dimension (n=7347) 
 beta t p-value 0.95 C.I. VIF 
min -0.232 -10.028 0.000 -0.277 -0.187 3.3 
max -0.045 -3.130 0.002 -0.073 -0.017 5.47 
 
Variable to be tested is the interaction between party dominance and party ideology for 
the dominant but non-congruent party, variable always remaining in the model is the 
ideology of the congruent party, and the repressors used in combinations are all 
remaining predictors in the model. Results are at .95 confide ce level and the maximum 





Extreme Bound Analysis for Multiple Regression of Left/Right Self-Placement for 
Respondents Ideologically Incongruent with the Dominant Party, When Party 
Dominance is Measured on the Governmental Dimension (n=7905) 
 beta t p-value 0.95 C.I. VIF 
min 0.042 3.378 0.001 0.018 0.067 6.8 
max 0.053 4.019 0.000 0.027 0.079 1.91 
 
The variable to be tested is the interaction between party dominance and party ideology 
for the dominant but non-congruent party, the variable always remaining in the model is 
the ideology of the congruent party, and the repressors used in combinations are all 
remaining predictors in the model. Results are at .95 confide ce level and the maximum 




Extreme Bound Analysis for Multiple Regression of Left/Right Self-Placement for 
Respondents Ideologically Congruent with the Dominant Party, When Party 
Dominance is Measured on the Electoral Dimension (n=5742) 
 beta t p-value 0.95 C.I. VIF 
min 0.076 2.836 0.005 0.024 0.131 3.34 
max 0.085 3.115 0.002 0.031 0.138 3.37 
 
Variable to be tested is the interaction between party dominance and party ideology, 
variable always remaining in the model is party ideology, and repressors used in 
combinations are all remaining predictors in the model. Results are at .95 confidence 
level and the maximum VIF is 10. A total of four combinations of three repressors from 
the Z vector are used. 
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Table 9 
Extreme Bound Analysis for Multiple Regression of Left/Right Self-Placement for 
Respondents Ideologically Congruent with the Dominant Party, When Party 
Dominance is Measured on the Governmental Dimension (n=5184) 
 beta t p-value 0.95 C.I. VIF 
Min 0.095 12.824 0.000 0.080 0.109 2.4 
Max 0.102 12.393 0.000 0.086 0.118 1.3 
 
Variable to be tested is the interaction between party dominance and party ideology, 
variable always remaining in the model is party ideology, and repressors used in 
combinations are all remaining predictors in the model. Results are at .95 confidence 
level and the maximum VIF = 10. A total of four combinations of three repressors from 






































1These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 
 
2Vote and seat indicators of party dominance are calculated based on data from Mackie and Rose (1991), 
Parties and Elections in Europe: the Database about Elections, Parties, and Political Leaders in Europe. 
http://www.parties-and-elections.de (March 19, 2004), Election Resources on the Internet: Elections to the 
German Bundestag. http://electionresources.org/de/ (March 19, 2004), Japanese Politics Central.  
http://jpcentral.virginia.edu/Elections.htm (March 19, 2004) and Stanley and Niemi (2000). 
 
3The emphasis on continuous governing years is important. A dominant party has to keep its electoral or 
governmental strength in a continuous fashion, rather than with a lot of gaps. This is especially significant 
when it comes to the implications of party dominance for liberal democracies. If a party keeps winning 
elections in a row (such as the SAP managed to do between 1932 and 1976 or the DC did between 1945 
and 1994), it leaves one to doubt the relevance of elections as a crucial institutional component of liberal 
democracies. The implication from such bucking of the trend of democratic commonsense potentially has 
large implications for the public’s political attitudes, including feelings of efficacy, political interest, 
participation orientation and so forth. In other words, a really dominant party not only has to win a lot of 
elections, it also has to win them back to back. 
 
4 Data about years spent in government or in coalition are obtained from Woldendorp et al. (2000). 
 
5 0.684+(-0.065)=0.619; 0.684+(-0.03)=0.654, and 0.684+0.064=0.748. All other coefficients for party 
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Table 1 
Multiple Regression of Left/Right Self-Placement for Respondents Ideologically 
Incongruent with the Dominant Party, When Party Dominance is Measured on the 
Electoral Dimension (n=7347) 
 
Predictor Estimate 
Ideology of the Congruent but Non-dominant Party c)025.0(684.0  
Ideology of the Incongruent but Dominant Party c)033.0(217.0  
Dominance-Ideology Interaction for the Congruent 
Party 
c)017.0(122.0  
Dominance-Ideology Interaction for the Incongruent  
Party 
 c)025.0(233.0−  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Congruent 
Party (1)5 
Dropped  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Congruent 
Party (2) 
b)026.0(065.0−  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Congruent 
Party (3) 
c)024.0(03.0−  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Congruent 
Party (4) 
b)028.0(064.0  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Incongruent 
Party (1) 
Dropped  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Incongruent 
Party (2) 
c)028.0(054.0  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Incongruent 
Party (3) 
0.034 (0.026) 
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Incongruent 
Party (4) 
b)029.0(051.0−  
Socio-economic Status 0.003 (0.007) 
Constant c)148.0(412.1  
2R  0.362 
Adjusted 2R  0.361 
N 7347 











                                                                                                                                 
Table 2 
Multiple Regression of Left/Right Self-Placement for Respondents Ideologically 
Incongruent with the Dominant Party, When Party Dominance is Measured on the 
Governmental Dimension (n=7347) 
Predictor Estimate 
Ideology of the Congruent but Non-dominant Party c)025.0(696.0  
Ideology of the Incongruent but Dominant Party a)026.0(046.0  
Dominance-Ideology Interaction for the Congruent 
Party 
c)015.0(066.0  
Dominance-Ideology Interaction for the Incongruent  
Party 
0.012 (0.016) 
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Congruent 
Party (1) 
Dropped  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Congruent 
Party (2) 
a)027.0(051.0−  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Congruent 
Party (3) 
-0.013 (0.025) 
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Congruent 
Party (4) 
c)030.0(099.0  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Incongruent 
Party (1) 
Dropped  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Incongruent 
Party (2) 
0.029(0.025) 
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Incongruent 
Party (3) 
0.006 (0.024) 
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Incongruent 
Party (4) 
c)028.0(108.0−  
Socio-economic Status c)007.0(028.0  
Constant c)137.0(049.1  
2R  0.358 
Adjusted 2R  0.357 
N 7905 











                                                                                                                                 
 
Table 3 
Multiple Regression of Left/Right Self-Placement for Respondents Ideologically 
Congruent with the Dominant Party, When Party Dominance is Measured on the 
Electoral Dimension (n=5742) 
Predictor Estimate 
Ideology of the Dominant Party c)032.0(547.0  
Dominance-Ideology Interaction for the Dominant 
Party 
c)029.0(078.0  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Dominant Party 
(1) 
Dropped  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Dominant Party 
(2) 
0.004 (0.014) 
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Dominant Party 
(3) 
c)013.0(015.0  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Dominant Party 
(4) 
b)015.0(033.0  
Socioeconomic Status -0.003 (0.009) 
Constant c)100.0(165.2  
2R  0.202 
Adjusted 2R  0.201 
N 5742 















                                                                                                                                 
Table 4 
Multiple Regression of Left/Right Self-Placement for Respondents Ideologically 
Congruent with the Dominant Party, When Party Dominance is Measured on the 
Governmental Dimension (n=5742) 
Predictor Estimate 
Ideology of the Dominant Party c)020.0(494.0  
Dominance-Ideology Interaction for the Dominant 
Party 
c)008.0(100.0  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Dominant Party 
(1) 
Dropped  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Dominant Party 
(2) 
0.003 (0.014) 
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Dominant Party 
(3) 
c)013.0(017.0  
Awareness-Ideology Interaction for the Dominant Party 
(4) 
c)016.0(053.0  
Socioeconomic Status a)10.0(019.0−  
Constant c)101.0(494.2  
2R  0.219 
Adjusted 2R  0.219 
N 5184 
Mean VIF 1.68 
 
a p<.1 
b p<.05 
c p<.01 
 
 
 
